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Abstract
Identification schemes are interactive protocols typically involving two parties, a
prover, who wants to provide evidence of his or her identity and a verifier, who checks
the provided evidence and decide whether it comes or not from the intended prover.
In this paper, we comment on a recent proposal for quantum identity authentication
from Zawadzki [1], and give a concrete attack upholding theoretical impossibility results
from Lo [2] and Buhrman et al. [3]. More precisely, we show that using a simple strategy
an adversary may indeed obtain non-negligible information on the shared identification
secret. While the security of a quantum identity authentication scheme is not formally
defined in [1], it is clear that such a definition should somehow imply that an external
entity may gain no information on the shared identification scheme (even if he actively
participates injecting messages in a protocol execution, which is not assumed in our
attack strategy).
1 Introduction
One of the major goals of cryptography is authentication in different flavours, namely,
providing guarantees that certain interaction is actually involving certain parties from a
designated presumed set of users. In the two party scenario, cryptographic constructions
towards this goal are called identity authentication schemes, and have been extensively
studied in classical cryptography. The advent of quantum computers spells the possible end
for many of these protocols however.
Since Wiesner proposed using quantum mechanics in cryptography in the 1970’s multiple
directions using this concept have undergone serious research. One major role quantum
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mechanics has played in cryptography is the development of quantum key distribution
(QKD) where two parties can securely share a one time pad using quantum mechanics, for
example the seminal protocol BB84 [4]. One drawback most of these protocols share is the
need for authentication, which is traditionally done over an authenticated classical channel.
Classically, there are different ways of defining so-called identification schemes, for mu-
tual authentication of peers, mainly depending on whether the involved parties share some
secret information (such as a password) or should rely on different (often certified) keys
provided by a trusted third party. In the quantum scenario, different identification proto-
cols have been introduced following the first approach, e.g., assuming that two parties may
obtain authentication evidence from the common knowledge of a shared secret. These kind
of constructions, often called quantum identity authentication schemes (or just quantum
identification schemes), are thus closely related to protocols for quantum equality tests and
quantum private comparison. All these constructions are concrete examples of two-party
computations with asymmetric output, i.e. allowing only one of the two parties involved
to learn the result of a computation on two inputs. Without posing restrictions on an ad-
versary it was shown by Lo in [2] and and Buhrman et al. in [3] that these constructions
are impossible, even in a quantum setting. As a consequence, constructions for generic
unrestricted adversaries in the quantum setting are doomed to failure.
All in all, the necessity for authentication in QKD has led to many authors considering
approaches which are strictly quantum in nature, such as those in [5, 6, 7] which are based
off entanglement or more recently [1, 8] which do not rely on entanglement. These are
known as quantum identity authentication (QIA) protocols. For protocols such as BB84
that do not rely on entanglement it would be more appealing to not rely on entanglement
for entity authentication purposes.
Our Contribution. Recently, an original work about authentication without entanglement
by Hong et. al. in [8] was improved by Zawadzki using tools from classical cryptography in
[1]. We start this contribution by summarizing in section 2 the impossibility results from
Lo [2] and Buhrman et al. [3], concerning generic quantum two party protocols. Further, we
present and discuss the Zawadzki protocol in section 3 and show how it succumbs under a
simple attack, which we outline in section 4. Our attack evidences the practical implications
of the proven impossibility of identification schemes as conceived in Zawadki’s design, and
thus we stress that fundamental changes in the original proposal, beyond preventing our
attack, would be needed in order to derive a secure identification scheme.
2 Quantum Equality Tests are Impossible
A one sided equality test is a cryptographic protocol in which one party, Alice, convinces
another, Bob, that they share a common key by revealing nothing to either party except
equality (or inequality) to Bob. Formally we define a key space K and a function F : K2 →
{0, 1} which checks for equality. Let i ∈ K be Alice’s key and j ∈ K be Bob’s key. The
goals of a one sided equality test are as follows:
1) F (i, j) = 1 if and only if i = j.
2) Alice learns nothing about j nor about F (i, j).
3) Bob learns F (i, j) with certainty. If F (i, j) = 0 then Bob learns nothing about i
2
except i 6= j.
The above is a specific case of a one-sided two-party secure computation protocol as de-
scribed in [2]. In this work, a very general result is proven indicating that any protocol
realising a one-sided two party secure computation task is impossible, even in a quantum
setting. In particular, Lo shows in [2] that if a protocol satisfies 1) and 2) then Bob can
know the output of F (i, j) for any j. Furthermore, the one sided equality test with some
small relaxations on points 1) and 3) is also proven impossible. Hence, any one-sided QIA
protocol which validates identities using equality tests by use of quantum mechanics is
impossible without imposing restrictions on an adversary.
Note that the above argument says nothing about protocols with built in adversarial
assumptions such as those presented in [9, 10]. Further, note that many of the QIA schemes
end up with a round where Bob accepts or rejects, which makes Alice aware of the success
or failure of the protocol. Indeed, those schemes can be straightforwardly turned into one-
sided equality tests by suppressing Bob’s final message announcing the result. Hence, they
are clearly insecure against a dishonest Bob. However, note that if any such protocol can be
modified so that Alice may obtain information on the identification output at some point
before the last protocol round, it is unclear how Lo’s impossibility result would apply. How-
ever, if they are built upon equality tests we can get impossibility from another well know
result by Buhrman el al.[3]. Certainly, two-sided QIA schemes, in which both Alice and
Bob learn the result of the protocol, are a particular case of two-sided two-party computa-
tions. It is shown in [3] that a correct quantum protocol for a classical two-sided two-party
computation that is secure against one of the parties is completely insecure against the
other. For equality tests, if one of the parties, say Alice, learns nothing else than F (i, j),
the other party, Bob, will indeed be able to compute F (i, j) for all possible inputs j. Thus,
any two-sided QIA protocol which validates identities using equality tests is also impossible
without imposing further restrictions on the adversary.
3 QIA without Entanglement
Here we will outline the protocol proposed in [1] with some minor modifications, discussed
afterword. Suppose Alice and Bob have keys ka and kb respectively. Bob wishes to verify
that kb = ka without leaking any information about kb or ka. Bob randomly generates a
nonce r from a designated domain and generates a universal hash function H : {0, 1}N →
{0, 1}2d. This hash function may be chosen by Bob or sampled at random, in the below
description we sample from a space of universal hash functions with image {0, 1}2d called
H. Bob sends Alice r and H. Alice then calculates the value ha = H(r||ka). Alice then
acts on pairs in ha with an embedding function Q : {0, 1}
2 → C2. This function Q uses the
first of the two binary values to determine the measurement basis (horizontal/vertical or
diagonal/antidiagonal) and the second to determine the specific qubit in {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉}.
For example, Q(0, 0) = |0〉 and Q(1, 0) = |+〉. Applying Q to the pairs of bits in ha Alice
prepares and sends d qubits to Bob over the quantum channel.
Upon reception, Bob computes hb = H(r||kb). Note that if ka = kb then ha = hb.
Using the first bit of each pair Bob measures the quantum states and insures he obtains
the correct qubit according to the second bit of the pair. If Bob measures something that
disagrees with the even bits of hb then Bob rejects Alice’s challenge. If after measuring all
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qubits Bob has not yet rejected Alice’s challenge then he accepts her challenge.
Changes made to the protocol are as follows: (1) Bob generates r and H, this is done
to thwart a simple attack discussed later; (2) the hash function changes between trials, this
has no impact on the security of the protocol due to the public nature of the hash in both
instances; and finally (3) here we assume for simplicity that Alice and Bob obtain the same
nonce r with certainty, using classical error correction techniques one can be relatively
certain both parties obtain the same nonce. See below for a schematic overview of the
protocol.
Alice Bob
ka kb
r←$ {0, 1}∗
H ←$H
r H
Classical
ha ← H(r||ka)
|ϕi〉 ← Q(ha2i−1 , ha2i)
repeat for all i=1,2,...,d
hb ← H(r||kb)
|ϕi〉 ∀i ≤ d
Quantum
si ←M(|ϕi〉, hb2i−1)
repeat for all i=1,2,...,d
if si = hb2i∀i ≤ d, accept
otherwise, reject
Accept/Reject
Classical
Figure 1. The protocol presented in [1]
The reason we force Bob to generate the randomness instead of Alice is that an adver-
sary with unbound quantum memory may impersonate Bob but not make a measurement.
Suppose an adversary does not know the key but requests Alice to identify herself. If Alice
generates and sends r,H with the string of states |ϕi〉 then the adversary may record r,H
and hold in memory, but not measure, the qubits. At a later time an honest participant
may ask the adversary to identify themselves, in this case the adversary may send r,H and
the qubits in memory. Thus, the adversary correctly forges an authentication. Note that as
we have presented the algorithm an adversary may still make this impersonation by waiting
between Alice and Bob then passing the information between the two. The difference is as
long as Bob generates the nonce then this attack must only be done while Alice and Bob
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are both online, whereas if Alice generates and sends the nonce then an adversary may hold
the states for as long as is technologically feasible.
The proposed protocol is claimed to be leakage resistant when considering an adversary
measuring in a random basis. The reasoning behind this is that unless an adversary, Eve,
correctly guesses the correct basis for each round, she will obtain different values for at least
one of the bits of the hash. Now suppose an adversary is capable of computing preimages
of hash functions through brute force with unbounded classical computational power or
through dictionary attacks with unbounded classical memory. In this case it is unlikely
that there will exist a ke ∈ K such that H(r||ke) matches what Eve measured. In the event
there does exist such a ke then with overwhelming probability ke 6= ka = kb and Eve will
not be able to falsify authentication of Alice or Bob.
Unfortunately, the proposed protocol is claimed to be exactly a two-sided equality test
with possible, though unlikely, relaxation of F (i, j) = 1 if and only if i = j (in this case
i is ka and j is kb). We know such a protocol has necessary leakage and due to the non-
interactive nature of Bob we know that kb has no leakage, thus we know there must exist
some leakage on ka. Although Eve may not be able to determine any exact bit of ka she may
drastically reduce the number of possible options for ka and hence construct a proper subset
of K such that the true value for ka is contained in this subset. An attack exemplifying
this phenomenon is described in the next section.
4 A Key Space Reduction Attack on QIA without Entangle-
ment (our contribution)
Before discussing the specific attack, let B be a set of orthogonal bases in C2 and consider
the following fact. If a quantum state is prepared in a basis b ∈ B with value v ∈ {0, 1},
then an adversary may always remove one possible combination of b and v with a single
measurement. Upon measuring in basis b′ ∈ B an adversary obtains v′ ∈ {0, 1}. The
adversary is then certain the original pair (b, v) was not (b′, 1
⊕
v′), as when measured
in the basis b the qubit prepared by b and v will yield v with certainty. Note that the
adversary cannot say with certainty how the qubit was prepared, but they can always
remove one possible option.
Suppose now that instead of sampling at random for b and v, the qubit is prepared using
a private key k ∈ K and a set of public parameters p, namely b = b(k, p) and v = v(k, p).
An adversary once again measures in basis b′ ∈ B (chosen or taken at random) to obtain
v′ ∈ {0, 1}, they may then determine a basis/value pair in which the qubit was not prepared.
Because the adversary is assumed to be computationally unbounded they may then compute
b(kˆ, p) and v(kˆ, p) for all kˆ ∈ K. Whenever these computations output the impossible pair
k′, v′ the adversary becomes aware that kˆ 6= k, hence reducing the key space. The extent to
which the key space is reduced depends on the number of basis in B. If the distribution of
basis choices in B is low entropy the attack may be accomplished as described while if B is
high entropy then a probabilistic version decreases the space of likely keys. The assumption
that the adversary is computationally unbounded may be lifted if k is low entropy (for he
can then indeed test all possible values for k — given there are only a polynomial set of
candidates), however assuming a computationally bounded adversary immediately removes
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unconditional security as an end goal.
Let us now apply this key space reduction to the QIA protocol proposed in [1], in this
case the private key is k and the public parameters are r and H. Suppose an Eve has no
a priori knowledge of the key except its existence in K. After receiving r and H over the
classical channel she measures all qubits |ϕi〉 received from Alice in the horizontal/vertical
basis and records the outputs as M . In the case where Eve is utilizing man-in-the-middle
she is done, if she is impersonating Bob she accepts or rejects the protocol.
After the protocol finishes the adversary may then compute h
kˆ
= H(r||kˆ) for all kˆ ∈ K.
Suppose the first qubit Eve measured in M was |0〉. She now examines the first two bits
of each h
kˆ
, those that begin 00, 10, or 11 are all possible of obtaining the qubit |0〉 after
measurement. The first of these three tuples will yield |0〉 with certainty and the later two
with a probability of 0.5. The final tuple 01 however is not possible as that would imply
that the qubit started in the state |1〉 and measured in |0〉. Thus, Eve knows that any kˆ
such that h
kˆ
begins 01 is not the key. The hash function is assumed to be independent
and identically distributed so this removes approximately 1
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of all possible keys. Repeat
this process for all qubits. After completion of all hash and check operations the adversary
has obtained a subset of the key space which contains the key, hence causing information
leakage. Specifically, the adversary knows the key is in subset S defined by
S = {s ∈ K : hs2i = Mi and hs2i−1 = 0 ∀i ≤ d}.
Note that the true key k ∈ S and |S| ≈ (3
4
)d|K|. This attack may be repeated using other
choice of bases (i.e.- not always selecting the horizontal/vertical basis) and utilizing the
same approach these different bases will likely yield different subsets of K. The key is in
the intersection of all these subsets, decreasing the possible key space further. Note that
after applying this attack the advantage of adversary may be negligible yet if (3
4
)d|K| is
still not negligible in the security parameter. Parameters are not listed in [1] however it
does not seem unreasonable that d is sufficiently large compared to |K|, otherwise a false
positive for authentication is more likely.
5 Other QIA protocols
It is worth pointing out that the attack described in section 4 also applies to the protocol by
Hong et al. [8], which Zawadzki [1] modifies. In more detail, the protocol in [8] is similar to
Zawadzki’s, but do not use a hash function. Instead, whenever Alice transmits the qubits
sequentially and, before sending each qubit, she randomly decides if she is going to use
security mode or authentication mode. In the first case, she sends a decoy state while in
the second one, a qubit encoding two bits of the authentication string is sent, similarly to
[1]. After Bob’s reception, Alice announces which mode she just has used. Therefore an
adversary using the same strategy described in our attack in section 4 and collecting the
information obtained whenever Alice announces authentication mode, will be able to shrink
the size of the key space in the same way we have previously stated.
On the other hand, other quantum identification protocols proposed in the literature are
not vulnerable to our attack neither contradict the impossibility result mentioned in section
2. For instance, some of them [5, 6, 11] are aided by the presence of a trusted third party,
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therefore not being real two-party protocols. Another type of protocols, such as [12, 13, 14],
make use of an entangled quantum state shared between both parties. In [12] the users,
in addition, share a bitstring used as a password; both parties measures their part of the
entangled state to produce a one time key that one of the users XORs with the password
and sends the result to the other who checks for consistency. The downside of this approach
is that, to repeat the identification process, the parties need to be provided again with new
entangled states. In [13, 14] the users do not share any classical secret, they just use the
entangled state to identify themselves.
6 Conclusion
The protocol given by Zawadzki in [1] may be secure against hash preimage attacks when
attempting to find an exact match, however when considering impossible results from quan-
tum measurements we see some hashed key values are not possible. Proverbially, the forest
may be secure but each of the trees reveals enough information to reconstruct the possible
forests. By eliminating approximately one quarter of the key options from each qubit we
see that by measuring all the individual qubits in a random basis does in fact reveal a great
deal about the key. This attack has no concern on quantum memory though relies heavily
on classical computation power. Hence, unlike [9, 10] where the authors consider a bounded
quantum storage model, the only way to make this protocol secure without greatly changing
its construction is to constrict an adversaries computational power.
The attack proposed here is general in the sense of QIA protocols in the prepare and
measure setup, thus any future protocol of this type must consider possible key space
reduction attacks. Regardless of the method it is known that any identification protocol
which poses no bounds on the adversary will inevitably fail due to results of Lo and Buhrman
et al. For this reason we advise that any future attempts at identification schemes consider,
and clearly communicate, their assumptions and objectives.
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